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On intellectual capital efficiency and shariah governance in 
Islamic banking business model 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper empirically investigates whether intellectual capital (IC) and shariah governance 
jointly affect the economic performance of Islamic banks (IBs). In contrast to prior research, 
this paper disaggregate IC and corporate governance features and examine whether the two are 
jointly related to economic performance. These relationships are further explored before, 
during and after the financial crisis based on a sample of 64 Islamic banks operating in different 
regions during the period 2007-2014. The required data to calculate different constituents of 
IC efficiency and governance mechanism is hand collected from 512 annual reports. After 
controlling for other corporate governance and bank-specific characteristics (operational type, 
bank size, listing status, risk, type of auditor, accounting standard and region), we find both 
intellectual capital efficiency and shariah governance proxies (size and dominance of 
prominent scholars of shariah supervisory board) to have a significant positive relationship 
with accounting measure of performance. However, based on market performance measure, 
only one proxy for shariah governance mechanism i.e. prominent scholars on SSB, is found to 
be significant but in the negative direction. These results provide important insights into the 
relationship between IC efficiency, corporate governance and performance in Islamic banking 
business model and have policy and practical implications. 
 
Keywords: intellectual capital, Islamic banks, corporate governance, shariah supervisory 
board, operating structure, resource-based view.
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1. Introduction 
Driven by religious business ethics, Islamic banks entered the main stream financial services 
sector about half a century ago to provide banking solutions that comply with Islamic 
jurisprudence (shariah) which eschew interest (riba), speculative trading or investments 
(gharar), excessive risk taking – in their investment and financing dealings and involve Islamic 
banks in the risk sharing of the proceeds and revenues of the borrower (Beck et al., 2013). 
Shariah compliance also prohibits issuance of debt/new products against debt/credit i.e. 
financial securitisation. In addition to these ontological and epistemological covenants, shariah 
places strong emphasis on justice and fairness and as such, requires all financial transactions 
to be backed by a real economic transaction that involves tangible assets (Nawaz, 2019) and 
restricts the use of many derivative products, including reasons such as excessive uncertainty, 
writing credit over credit, or derivative transactions that defer the transfer of money/capital and 
commodity/product in future (Obaidullah, 2005). The risk-sharing covenant of Islamic banking 
business model, require designing saving accounts that make depositors/investment account 
holders’ return non-interest bearing and gives IBs discretion in to pay a return that based on 
IBs overall profitability or for that matter losses. Operationally, the revenue streams of IBs 
come mainly from investment, trade-based profit and fee-based services while their asset-side 
products can be either equity-based such as musharakah (capital-capital partnership) and 
mudarabah (capital-labour partnership or joint venture), or interest-free debt-based products 
like ijarah (leasing) and murabahah (cost-plus sale). Hence, the business model of Islamic 
banks is clearly different from conventional banks as it is faith-driven and must be shariah-
compliant. This also means that the components of their financial statements are to some extent 
different from that of conventional banks. 
Despite its impressive growth and recognition by the World Islamic Banking 
Competitiveness Report 2013-14 as a major force in global banking enjoying an annual growth 
3 
rate of 15-20% and assets exceeding US$2 trillion by 2014 (Nazim & Bennie, 2012), Islamic 
banks cannot remain complacent as competition in the banking sector has intensified over the 
past decade (Ariss, 2010).  Hence, it is imperative for Islamic banks to consider embracing new 
strategic priorities such as efficient investments in new capital and putting in place appropriate 
governance mechanisms that will help in sustaining their performance.  
As one of the most knowledge-intensive industries (Mavridis & Kyrmizoglou, 2005; 
Chen et al., 2014), banks, including Islamic banks, no longer rely on their physical capital to 
maintain their performance. Efficient and effective management of and investments in 
intangible assets, or also referred to as intellectual capital (IC), are deemed essential to achieve 
and sustain superior performance (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996). IC has also been 
acknowledged as the most important source of competitive advantage that will lead to 
innovation of new products (Subramaniam & Youndt, 2005) and better quality services and in 
turn, better bottom line.  While there has been a number of studies that have looked at the 
association between IC and performance of conventional banks in different countries (Pulic, 
2004; Goh, 2005; Mondal & Ghosh, 2012; Ismail & Karem, 2011), the results have been mixed.  
Since Islamic banks need to generate new innovative shariah-compliant products to compete 
in the market, it is expected that the nature of their investments in IC will be different and in 
turn on their performance. Therefore, a study is needed to provide insights on the relationship 
between IC and Islamic banks’ performance to see if they are (dis)similar to other prior studies. 
One important component of IC is related to investments in human capital as bank 
performance also relies on good governance mechanisms to constrain agency problems and 
moral hazard. This aspect has received substantial attention especially following the financial 
crisis (Aebi et al., 2012). While conventional banks adopt a single layer governance mechanism 
or unitary board system, Islamic banks have an additional layer of governance in the form of a 
shariah supervisory board (SSB) that provides oversight on commitment to ethical or shariah-
compliant practices (Grais & Pellegrini, 2006) such as ensuring that banks are not involved in 
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interest and speculation in their lending and investment activities, which may subsequently 
affect performance. Yet there are limited studies that have considered to what extent 
investments in SSB’s members contribute to performance of Islamic banks.  
Therefore, this paper contributes to both the IC and bank performance literature by 
exploring the relationship between intellectual capital efficiency and shariah governance 
mechanism on Islamic banks’ performance while controlling for a number of other corporate 
governance and bank-specific characteristics. While there have been many studies examining 
effects of various factors on banks’ performance during the financial crisis, there has not been 
any studies that have considered the association between IC and banks’ performance. Banks 
investment strategies in IC and governance mechanism may be different following financial 
crisis and in turn on their performance. Hence, we further contribute to this line of literature by 
exploring the relationship between IC and shariah governance mechanism on Islamic banks’ 
performance before, during and after the financial crisis.  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 presents the background 
and development of hypotheses for the current study.  An outline of the research design is then 
presented in Section 3 followed by the empirical results in Section 4.  The paper ends with the 
concluding remarks and avenues for further research. 
 
2. Background and development of hypotheses 
Banks’ performance may be affected by both micro- and macro-economic factors (see Dietrich 
& Wanzenried, 2011; Beltratti & Stulz, 2012), which in turn have important implications not 
only on investors and depositors but also to the economy and society. The literature on 
determinants of bank performance can be split into those that are internal and those that are 
external (Staikouras & Wood, 2011). The former is associated with factors that are influenced 
by banks’ management decisions and policy objectives such as effectiveness in managing the 
balance sheet structure (Wall, 1983; Zimmerman, 1996), governance aspects (Sierra et al., 
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2006) as well as investment, marketing and operational strategies.  The latter, on the other hand, 
are concerned with factors that are influenced by events outside the bank such as regulatory 
and macroeconomic factors. However, the extant literature on bank performance has failed to 
consider efficiency of banks’ intangible assets investment strategies on their performance, 
especially in the context of financial crisis.  
Likewise, the extant literature on Islamic banks’ performance has either explored 
determinants of performance on a single country basis e.g. Pakistan (Akhtar et al., 2011), 
Malaysia (Wasiuzzaman & Tarmizi, 2010) or compared performance between conventional 
and Islamic banks in a single country or region such as Safiullah (2010) for Bangladesh; 
Onakoya and Onakoya (2013) for UK; Hanif et al. (2012) for Pakistan; Elsiefy (2013) for 
Qatar; Olson and Zoubi (2008) and Srairi (2009) for GCC and only a few have examined across 
countries (Beck et al., 2013; Johnes et al., 2014). These studies have also considered both 
macroeconomic (inflation, GDP growth) and bank specific characteristics (bank size, credit 
risk and operational cost) including corporate governance as possible determinants for Islamic 
banks’ performance. 
Our paper extends previous studies by focusing on two internal factors related to 
management’s strategic investment policies and introduced an external factor based on 
financial crisis.  In the following sections, we discuss each of them in more detail and develop 
our hypotheses accordingly. 
 
2.1 Islamic banks’ performance and intellectual capital 
According to the resource-based view of the firm, gaining sustained competitive advantage 
requires organisations to exploit the bundle of tangible and intangible resources that they have 
(Wernerfelt, 1984; Penrose, 1995) into valuable resources that are neither imitable nor 
substitutable without great effort. The significance of intangible assets along with the 
traditional tangible economic resources i.e. land, labour and capital for superior economic 
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returns and sustained market valuation – underpinned by the resource-based view of the firm 
is gaining acceptance in various research streams stretching from economics, finance and 
accounting to organisational and strategic management studies (Reed et al., 2006). Thus, it is 
not surprising to find organisations becoming increasingly reliant on knowledge and experience 
(Stewart & Ruckdeschel, 1998), which constitutes intellectual capital (IC) or also referred to 
as intangibles (Villalonga, 2004), rather than physical assets in creating value. IC refers to the 
knowledge resources used to create value and attain competitive advantage in the market. IC 
can be further broken down into human capital (HC) and structural capital (SC), with the former 
embedded in the organisation’s employees while the latter refers to the supportive 
infrastructure enabling knowledge to be converted into something owned by the organisation 
(Edvinsson & Malone, 1997). Petty and Guthrie (2000) include another component of IC called 
relational capital which refers to the ability of the organisation in creating and building 
relational capital with its external stakeholders through for example, customer and brand 
loyalty, customer satisfaction, market image and goodwill, power to negotiate, strategic 
alliances and coalitions (Joshi et al., 2013). 
Following the rapid growth in the services sector, researchers have started to pay more 
attention to IC in the banking sector (Goh, 2005; Mavridis & Kyrmizoglou, 2005; Ismail & 
Karem, 2011; Joshi et al., 2013). It has been suggested that value creation in knowledge-
intensive sectors such as the banking industry requires both IC and physical assets (Marr & 
Adams, 2004; Chen et al., 2014).  Likewise, Goh (2005) recognises the importance of physical 
capital but further argues that in the banking sector, it is IC that determines the quality of 
services provided to customers. Ismail and Karem (2011) note that human capital is the main 
driver of performance in banks and Nawaz (2019) suggest that banks need to invest in the 
training of their human resources (i.e. HC), brand building, systems and processes (SC) to 
ensure competitive success.  
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One popular method of assessing value added by the company’s resources (Firer & 
Williams, 2003) is the VAIC model developed by Pulic (2000). It is suggested that the higher 
the bank’s value added intellectual coefficient (VAIC) and its sub-components i.e. human 
capital efficiency (HCE), structural capital efficiency (SCE) and capital employed efficiency 
(CEE), the greater will be its competitive advantage leading to better firm performance. Studies 
that focused on the relationship between IC efficiency and bank performance based on VAIC 
model find conclusive evidence of a positive relationship between the two (Mondal & Ghosh, 
2012), particularly human capital (Goh, 2005). However, the relationship between IC 
efficiency and Islamic banks’ performance has been relatively unexplored. 
The resource-based view of the firm further holds that a firm evaluates the strengths 
and weaknesses of its resources and then selects an achievable strategy accordingly. Human 
capital is one of the underlying strategic resources that is both supportive and necessary for 
organisational success since employees’ knowledge and skill are essential in knowledge 
intensive firms such as banks (Subramaniam & Youndt, 2005), including Islamic banks. We 
argue that knowledge embedded in the shariah supervisory board members provides Islamic 
banks with increased cognitive abilities (i.e. offering fatwa for complexed financial 
instruments), which distinguishes the human capital stock of Islamic banks than their 
conventional rivals. Islamic banks exploit such human capital resources to achieve and sustain 
competitive advantage in the market. 
Since IC resources drive a firm’s capability to innovate (Subramaniam & Youndt, 
2005), we argue that this is more so in the case of Islamic banking and finance institutions. 
They need to have higher investments in human intellectual capital since many of the 
employees may have less experience on the shariah banking model. Islamic banks also need to 
invest in structural capital to support innovation of the new business model. In addition, Islamic 
banks need to effectively manage the different types of financial resources as this is vital for 
gaining competitive advantage.  
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Human intellectual capital is particularly important for Islamic banks because the 
creation and endorsement of ethical products that are shariah compliant and the ability to cater 
to the needs of various groups of customers require human resources that have higher 
awareness of fiqh muamalat (Islamic jurisprudence that deals with commercial and business 
activities) as well as having competency in banking-related knowledge.  
Similarly, shariah compliant products and services require different treatments when 
recording contracts and transactions than conventional banks. Therefore, Islamic banks need 
to invest in infrastructure and computer networks that are better suited to deal with the 
complexity of their transactions. In short, value creation in Islamic banks is dependent on 
efficient and effective investments in human and structural capital, which will lead to tangible 
(e.g. new products or processes) and intangible (e.g. more experienced employees likely to 
engage in future product and service innovations) outputs, and subsequently better banks’ 
performance.  Therefore, our first hypothesis, based on both accounting and market based 
measures of performance, is stated as follows: 
 
H1: There is a statistically significant positive association between an Islamic 
bank’s performance and VAIC. 
H1a: There is a statistically significant positive association between an Islamic 
bank’s performance and its human capital efficiency (HCE).  
H1b: There is a statistically significant positive association between an Islamic 
bank’s performance and its structural capital efficiency (SCE) 
H1c: There is a statistically significant positive association between an Islamic 
bank’s performance and its capital employed efficiency (CEE).  
 
2.2 Islamic banks’ performance and shariah governance 
Islamic banks must at all times ensure that their aims, operations, business affairs and activities 
comply with shariah. The consequences of shariah non-compliant activities can potentially 
tarnish the banks’ reputation and reduce the confidence of depositors, investors, customers, and 
other stakeholders which in turn, affect their performance. In order to provide religious 
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legitimacy to their activities, Islamic banks appoint a number of shariah scholars to sit on their 
Shariah Supervisory Board (SSB). Members of this board play a vital role in providing input 
to Islamic banks on matters enabling the banks to comply with shariah principles. This includes 
setting shariah related rules and principle, issuing verdict (fatwa) and overseeing compliance 
to ensure that policies and procedures of the banks are in conformity with shariah (Nawaz, 
2019). Therefore, investment in shariah board members is an important strategic decision 
undertaken by Islamic banks. Having a large shariah board may signal to the banks’ 
stakeholders of their commitment in ensuring their activities are shariah compliant which in 
turn may boost their performance. Since some shariah scholars have higher reputation and 
credibility than others, having more prominent scholars on the SSB will further enhance the 
banks’ legitimacy and performance. Hence, we hypothesise the following two hypotheses: 
 
H2: There is a statistically significant positive association between an Islamic bank’s 
performance and the size of its SSB. 
 
H3: There is a statistically significant positive association between an Islamic bank’s 
performance and having more prominent scholars on its SSB. 
 
2.3 Islamic banks’ performance and corporate governance 
While there have been many studies conducted on the relationship between corporate 
governance and performance in the non-financial sector (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006), studies in 
the context of banks and more specifically Islamic banks, have been limited and needs 
examining.  
 
Board structure and bank performance 
It has been suggested that bigger boards will negatively affect firm performance (Hermalin & 
Weisbach, 2003) because of coordination costs and free-rider problems while smaller boards 
may enhance monitoring capabilities (Yermack, 1996; Khanchel, 2007). On the other hand, 
bigger boards may provide greater balance in promoting effective decision making which may 
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affect firm positively. It has also been argued that as board size increases, control and 
monitoring functions will be impaired (Dalton et al., 1999). The results on the association 
between bank performance and board size have been mixed. De Andres and Vallelado (2008) 
and Adams and Mehran (2012) find a significant positive relationship between board size and 
bank performance while Pathan and Faff (2013) find the relationship to be negative. Other 
studies (e.g. Wintoki et al., 2012) find no economically significant association between board 
size and firm performance, in contrast. In the context of Islamic banks, larger boards may 
provide balance for effective decision making beyond religious matters. Conversely, in the 
presence of a larger SSB the coordination costs of having larger board may affect negatively 
on Islamic bank’s performance. 
Closely related to board size is board independence i.e. the ratio of non-executive 
(outside) to executive (inside) directors, and its relationship with performance. Non-executive 
directors are needed to act as gatekeepers in aligning management and shareholders’ interest 
and reducing management’s opportunistic behaviour (Segrestin & Hatchuel, 2011; Li et al., 
2012), thus contributing mainly to the monitoring role as suggested by agency theory. On the 
other hand, resource-dependence theory highlights the important advisory and consulting role 
performed by non-executive directors owing to their possession of resources needed by the 
firm (Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006; Machold & 
Farquhar, 2013), such as expertise, prestige and networks, to help in the strategic decision 
making process in enhancing performance and maximising shareholders wealth (Knockaert & 
Ucbasaran, 2013). The results on the relationship between bank performance and board 
independence are also inconclusive. De Andres and Vallelado (2008) and Cornett et al. (2009) 
report a positive effect while Pathan and Faff (2013) note a negative effect. However, Adams 
and Mehran (2012) and Wintoki et al. (2012) do not find a significant relationship between 
board independence and firm performance. The inconclusiveness of the results and significance 
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of outside directors’ role on the board, cited in the aforementioned literature merits for further 
investigation in the context of Islamic banks. 
CEO power is another important attribute of effective governance. Although the 
theoretical argument suggest to separate the role of board’s chairperson and the CEO (see, 
among others, Dalton & Kesner, 1985, and Patton & Baker, 1987), the emperical evidience is 
far from reaching a consensus. This is especially the case in studies conducted in the context 
of Islmaic banks (e.g. Mollah & Zaman, 2015, Nawaz, 2019). The conventional literature 
strongly advocates for the separation of chairman and CEO roles (see Jensen, 1993) and this is 
supported by the empirical evidence, which suggests that CEO role duality diminishes board 
independence, cute board’s capacity to oversight managers’ actions and erupts decision making 
process (Yermack, 1996; Lehn & Zhao, 2006; Cerbioni & Parbonetti, 2007).  In the context of 
Islamic banks, giving too much power to the leadership go against the Islamic concept of shura 
(consultation) which calls for leaders to always seek advice from a group before making 
decisions. Similarly, strong and effective internal audit controls can determine managers’ 
behaviour in a timely fashion, which in turn reduces information asymmetry between the 
internal and external stakeholder and subsequently improves firm performance (Kalbers & 
Fogarty, 1993; Chen & Chen, 2012). Furthermore, the power of the audit committee may be 
stronger if their number is relatively large compared to the overall board size. 
 
2.4 Islamic banks’ performance and bank-specific characteristics 
Operating structure 
Islamic banks may choose to operate as Islamic windows or subsidiaries of conventional banks 
or operate as fully-fledged Islamic banks. The former is an operational strategy adopted by 
conventional banks for the purpose of attracting customers from conventional to shariah-
compliant banking, meeting increasing demand from customers for ethical products and 
improving mobilisations of savings. The downside of operating as windows or subsidiaries is 
that Islamic windows by design have to spend more internally on staff recruitment, training 
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and development and externally on branding and marketing to position themselves as shariah-
compliant business in the market to satisfy existing customers and attract potential clients 
looking for shariah-compliant financial services. Such additional costs may affect their bottom 
line. On the other hand, fully-fledged banks may have lower training and recruitment costs as 
staff have more specialised knowledge and experience as well as lower marketing cost as 
customers have more trust on their brand name and products.   
 
Size, listing status & risk 
On average, larger and listed banks are better performers because they are able to diversify 
their risk and also they have more analysts following which puts them under more pressure to 
perform well. Banks with more debts in their capital structure are more risky which may affect 
their performance. 
 
Auditor type, accounting standards & regions 
Auditor quality is often associated with firm size and engaging a Big4 auditor may reduce 
agency problems and moral hazard which would contribute to better performance. Islamic 
banks have a choice to either follow IFRS, AAOIFI or its own country’s standards and it is 
expected that banks that follow the former standards will show better performance as it is more 
flexible (principle-based). Islamic banks operating in the Middle-East are expected to perform 
better as they can draw from a larger wealthy client base. 
 
2.5 Conceptual framework 
Figure 1 presents the conceptual framework showing the relationships between the main 
explanatory factors and Islamic banks together with the set of hypotheses discussed earlier. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
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2.6 Effect of financial crisis on relationship between IC and shariah governance investments 
and Islamic banks’ performance 
 
The banking sector has received increased scrutiny from stakeholders following the financial 
crisis, which had affected bank performance. Hasan and Dridi (2010) suggest that Islamic 
banks were more resilient during the crisis compared to their conventional counterparts and 
hence, will continue to invest in IC and shariah supervisory boards. Therefore, we expect the 
association between such investments and Islamic bank’s performance to still hold before and 
after the financial crisis. Thus, we test the following null hypothesis: 
 
H4: There is no statistically significant difference in the positive association between 
an Islamic bank’s performance and its IC efficacy variables before and after the 
financial crisis. 
 
H5: There is no statistically significant difference in the positive association between 
an Islamic bank’s performance and its shariah governance variables before and 
after the financial crisis. 
 
3. Data, empirical method and variables description 
3.1 Sample selection 
We used BankScope database to extract financial data related to the sampled banks. There were 
147 Islamic banks listed in BankScope database and after eliminating banks due to limitations 
on data availability or no longer in existence, our final sample consists of 64 banks operating 
in 25 countries covering a period of eight years from 2007-2014, as can be seen in Table 1.  
This provides us with 512 bank-year observations. 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
3.2 Dependent and explanatory variables  
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Table 2 presents a summary of the operationalisation and source of the variables used in our 
model.  The dependent variable, bank performance, can be assessed in different ways.  For the 
purpose of this study, we used one common accounting based measures i.e. average return on 
asset, ROAA (Usoff et al., 2002) and Tobin’s Q as the market-based measure (Weir et al., 
2002). It has been argued that Tobin's Q is endogenous with respect to managerial decisions 
regarding a firm’s scale, with underinvestment inflating Tobin's Q (see Dybvig & Warachka, 
2015). The authors further contend that the q-ratio either increase or decreases based on the 
relative importance of scale decisions versus cost discipline, respectively. We acknowledged 
limitations in using Tobin’s Q as a market measure but have used it due to data constraint for 
Islamic banks. 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
Our first independent variable is related to overall IC efficiency. Following Pulic 
(2000), Goh (2005) and Mondal and Ghosh (2012), we calculate the value added intellectual 
coefficient (VAICTM) as proxy for the aggregate intellectual capital efficiency consisting of 
human capital efficiency (HCE), structural capital efficiency (SCE) and capital employed 
efficiency (CEE). The general formula takes the form of: VAICTM = HCE + SCE + CEE. The 
next set of independent variables is related to investments in shariah governance viz. shariah 
supervisory board size (SSBsize) and domination of prominent scholars on shariah supervisory 
board (SSBdominance). 
Our corporate governance control variables include: board size (LnBsize), board 
independence (Bindep) based on proportion of independent non-executive directors to total 
board size, CEO power (Dual) based on whether the CEO is also the chairman, audit committee 
size (ACS), audit committee power (ACP) based on proportion of non-executives who are audit 
committee members to total board size. Our bank-specific control variables include bank 
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operating structure i.e. full-fledged or Islamic windows (OS), bank size based on total assets 
(LnTA), risk based on debt to equity (Risk), dummy variables for listing status (list), auditor 
type (Big4), accounting standard based on IFRS or other (Accstd) and region based on whether 
it is in the GCC or other (Region). 
 
3.3 Econometric modelling 
We used the following model to test our hypotheses. 
 
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑥𝑛𝐼𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑥𝑛𝑆𝐺𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑥𝑛𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑥𝑛 + 𝜀𝑡𝑥 
 
where Performancei,t  is the proxy for the performance variable of bank i at time t, ICi,t is the 
matrix of intellectual capital efficiency variable of bank i at time t, SG i,t, is a matrix of shariah 
governance variables of bank i at time t, Control is a matrix of corporate governance variables 
and bank-specific characteristics of bank i at time t, Ɛt,x is the error term, α0 is the constant, and 
β and γ are the vectors of coefficient estimates. 
We used the model to analyse the effect of (i) intellectual capital efficiency (VAIC, 
HCE, SCE and CEE), and (ii) shariah governance (SSB size, SSB domination by prominent 
scholars), on bank performance (both accounting and market-based) using return on asset and 
Tobin’s Q as proxies for performance. We used the pooled OLS regression to test our model. 
 
4. Empirical results 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 3 provides the descriptive statistics viz. minimum, maximum, mean, standard deviation, 
standardised skewness and kurtosis, for the dependent and independent variables used in our 
models. Focusing first on the dependent variables (Panel A), it can be seen that the mean for 
ROAA is 8%, with a minimum of -13% and maximum of 77%. The negative minimum figure 
suggests some banks in the sample making a loss. The mean for Tobin’s Q is 1.08, ranging 
from a minimum of 0.49 to maximum of 2.35. 
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INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
As for the continuous independent variables (Panel B rows 3-6), the mean for value 
added intellectual coefficient (VAIC) is 20.12, with a minimum of 1.16 and maximum of 
446.75, indicating that Islamic banks in our sample are generally efficient in generating value 
from their intellectual capital. The means for the three sub-components, HCE, SCE and CEE 
are 18.51, 0.81 and 0.81, respectively. The high mean for HCE suggests that it is the main value 
driver as indicated by the effective utilisation of human capital during the study period.  
Further, as can be seen in Panel C, the value creation capability (VAIC) of Islamic banks over 
the period has deteriorated from 25.37 in 2007 to 17.46 in 2014, suggesting reduction in human 
capital efficiency (HCE). The SCE and CEE have remained relatively stable over the period. 
The mean economic performance measured by ROAA and Tobin’s Q, respectively and average 
IC efficiency of sampled IBs during the study period is illustrated in Figure 2. 
 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
With regards to shariah governance variables (Panel B rows 7 & 8), the mean size of 
SSB is 4, with a minimum and maximum of 1 and 14, respectively. This indicates heterogeneity 
within the industry on Shariah-monitoring policy. As for dominance of prominent shariah 
scholars serving on SSBs, it can be seen that some banks are 100% dominated by them and on 
average, they occupy about 26% of each SSB. Results reported in Panel C suggest that Islamic 
banks were efficient in creating value using their human, structural and financial resources 
during the study period. The negative value for VAIC during 2008-2011 suggest the impact of 
financial crisis and market adjustment. 
Table 3 (columns 8-20) also presents Pearson correlation matrix for the continuous 
variables. It can be seen that our variable of interest, VAIC, is significantly associated with 
both ROAA and Tobin’s Q, with the former in the positive direction and the latter in the 
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opposite direction. All three sub-components of VAIC are significantly and positively related 
to ROAA but negatively in the case of Tobin’s Q. In terms of shariah governance, SSB size is 
positively and significantly associated only with ROAA while dominance of prominent 
scholars on SSB is not significantly associated with both performance measures. 
The Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs) for all regressions is also computed for all 
regressions to check for multicollinearity (column 8). The highest value of VIF is 2.94, well 
below the conventional value of 10. Likewise, the lowest value of tolerance is 1.18, well above 
the conventional value of 0.1. There is no multicollinearity between the independent variables. 
 
4.2 Do intellectual capital efficiency and shariah governance affect Islamic banks’ 
accounting and market performance?  
 
Table 4 presents the results for two sets of models: VAIC and bank performance (Models 1 & 
2), and sub-components of VAIC and bank performance (Models 3 & 4). The difference 
between Models 1 & 2 is that the former is based on ROAA while the latter is based on Tobin’s 
Q. 
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
As can be seen in Model (1), the relation between accounting performance measurement 
(ROAA) and VAIC is positively and significantly related at the 1% level, as expected, and the 
result is consistent with prior studies for conventional banks (e.g. Ting & Lean, 2009; Pulic 
2002b).  On the other hand, in Model (2), the relation between the market performance measure 
(Tobin’s Q) and VAIC is insignificant and is in the direction opposite to expectation. Hence, 
our hypothesis H1 is only supported based on accounting performance. Our results suggest that 
Islamic banks that are efficient in using their intellectual capital are able to generate higher 
profitability. 
SSB size relates positively (at 5% significance level) with profitability but insignificant 
based on market performance measure, thus partially supporting H2. SSB dominated by 
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prominent scholars is significant at the 5% and 1% levels based on profitability and market 
value respectively, with the former in the positive direction as expected while the latter in the 
opposite direction. Hence, our H3 is supported except that the direction for market value is 
opposite to expectation. This indicates that the market perceives less favourably banks with 
prominent figures on the SSB although the results suggest that they may help enhance banks’ 
profitability. A further plausible interpretation of the results is that the market may perceive 
prominent figures as an extra expense as compare to relatively less known SSB members and 
may put negative value to banks dominated by prominent shariah scholars. Equally, some of 
the prominent scholars holding more than fifty SSB positions within the Islamic finance 
industry, thus, such a high concentration may signal the market the demand on one’s time, 
which relates negatively with market value. This merits for further investigation by the future 
research in this area. 
Models (3) & (4) show the relationship between bank performance and the three VAIC 
sub-components. Based on Models 3 and 4, the regression results indicate both HCE and CEE 
to have highly significant effect on both performance measures, with the former in opposite 
direction to expectation while the former in positive direction as expected, thus supporting H1a 
and H1c. The negative result for HCE performance suggest that high investment on human 
capital reduces profit and market value, which is contrary to prior studies (e.g. Goh, 2005; 
Mavridis & Kyrmizoglou, 2005) for conventional banks. The positive result for CEE indicates 
that efficient utilisation of financial capital helps in generating profit as well as increase market 
value, which is consistent with prior studies (e.g. Saengchan, 2008; Ting & Lean, 2009) for 
conventional banks. However, SCE has a significant positive effect only on ROAA (at 1% 
level), thus partially supporting H1b. The result is contrary to Ting and Lean (2009). 
In all four models, we include corporate governance and bank-specific characteristics 
as control variables. In terms of corporate governance, our regression results indicate board 
size and board independence to have a significant positive effect only on profitability. This 
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result is consistent with De Andres and Vallelado (2008) and Cornett et al. (2009). Role duality, 
contrary to expectation and inconsistent with Cerbioni and Parbonetti (2007) and Krause et al. 
(2014), is positive and highly significant for both models, but in the direction opposite to 
expectation. This suggests that role duality may actually help enhance profitability and market 
value as the CEO is able to pursue the vision of the bank more effectively. Audit committee 
size is negatively and significantly related only to profitability and in the direction opposite to 
expectation which is inconsistent to suggestion by Chen and Chen (2012). Audit committee 
power is insignificant in both Models 1 & 2 but significant in Model 3. The insignificant result 
is consistent with that of Wintoki et al. (2012). 
With regards to the business operational model, regression results indicate fully-fledged 
banks to be significantly related to profitability and market value with the former in negative 
direction and the latter in opposite direction. A possible reason for fully-fledged Islamic banks 
to be negatively related to accounting profitability may be attributed to higher operational cost, 
but positively related to market performance possibly due to the market perceiving them to 
have higher growth potential. 
Bank size has a significant negative effect on both performance measures, suggesting 
that bigger banks are less efficient but in the opposite direction to expectation. A possible 
explanation for smaller Islamic banks to be better performers may be attributed to less complex 
products and lower operating cost. Listed banks have significant positive effect on profitability 
but negative effect on market value.  Risk and auditor type are both insignificant regardless of 
the performance measure. Adoption of IFRS enhances profitability but not market value. Banks 
in the GCC have significant positive profitability and market value. 
 
4.3 Do the relationships between IC and shariah governance investments and Islamic banks’ 
performance differ before, during and after the financial crisis? 
 
Table 5 presents the regression results on the effect of the relationship between the two 
investment types of investments and bank performance before, during and after the financial 
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crisis. Based on accounting performance (Models 1, 2 & 3) and the three VAIC sub-
components, it can be seen that CEE is the main driver for profitability performance in all three 
periods. SCE is positively significant in the period during and post-crisis. The latter result 
suggests that efficient utilisation of structural capital becomes increasingly crucial for 
generating profit following the crisis. On the other hand, HCE is negatively associated with 
profitability in all three periods but only significant during the crisis period, suggesting that 
investments in human capital will reduce profitability significantly during the crisis period.  
Turning to market-based performance measure (Models 4, 5 & 6), SCE is only significantly 
positive with market value in the pre-crisis period. For the post-crisis period, CEE and HCE 
are both significantly associated with market value, positively in the case of the former and 
negatively for the latter. 
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
 
The variation in VAIC and its sub-components before, during and after the crisis 
suggests that investment efficiency is closely related to the market condition. As can be seen 
earlier in Panel C of Table 3, before the crisis, HCE was in an upward trend (10% increase) 
while CEE was in a downward trend (13% decrease). This suggests that banks invest less in 
human capital during the crisis and focuses more on improving efficiency of their capital 
employed. However, the degree of change in structural capital efficiency is steady regardless 
of the economic conditions. This suggests that banks favour adjusting HCE and CEE because 
they are more liquid than their investment in SCE, which remains relatively unchanged. 
In terms of shariah governance variables, SSB size is negatively associated to 
profitability in all three periods but significantly during the crisis, which is understandable as 
more expenses incurred in paying bigger boards will significantly reduce profitability. Results 
indicate having prominent scholars on SSB to have significant positive association with 
accounting performance in all three periods but with diminishing effect.  Based on market value 
21 
measure of performance, SSB size is not significantly related while having prominent scholars 
on SSB is significantly and negatively associated with market value during and after the crisis. 
This suggests that prominent SSB members are perceived as an ultra-expense by the market in 
the wake of financial malaise. Another interpretation of the negative association is that the 
market may hint to favour the non-prominent SSB members in times of financial distress and 
thereafter because they perceive prominent members have time constraint given the demand 
on their time and that non-prominent members may spend more time and extra efforts to study 
and resolve issues during the crisis and later in the adjustment period. 
As for the control variables, board size and board independence are positively and 
significantly associated with profitability; the latter during and after the crisis while the former 
only during the crisis. Audit committee size and power are both significantly associated with 
profitability only during the crisis period with the former in negative direction and the latter in 
the opposite direction. Interestingly, role duality has no effect on profitability in all three 
periods while it is the only variable to be positively and significantly related to Tobin’s Q in 
all three periods but with diminishing effect.  
Fully-fledged banks are significantly associated with performance after the crisis period 
but in the negative direction in the case of accounting measure. IFRS has significant positive 
effect on profitability while GCC banks have positive effect on market value in all three 
periods. Banks audited by Big4 and listed banks are significantly and positively related to 
profitability while large and listed banks are negatively and significantly related to market 
value, post crisis. 
 
5. Conclusion 
The main objective of our paper is to identify whether investments in intellectual capital and 
shariah governance have significant impact on performance of Islamic banks, while controlling 
for other corporate governance and bank-specific characteristics. Our regression results based 
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on VAIC suggest that Islamic banks have utilised their resources efficiently leading to increase 
in profitability but this was not reflected in the case of market value. This highlights that the 
relationship between performance and intellectual capital efficiency is dependent on which 
performance measure is considered. Our empirical results further reveal that both structural 
and financial capital efficiency are the main drivers for bank performance rather than human 
capital, as found in many studies in the context of conventional banks (Chen et al., 2014). The 
results for HCE suggest that the human capital expenditure to support the ethical business 
model adopted by the Islamic banks is expensive without optimal output as of yet. The results 
can be attributed to the phenomenal growth Islamic banking is experiencing since the beginning 
of the new millennium. To sustain the current growth trends, Islamic banks are spending more 
on human capital resource (Hasan & Dridi, 2010). However, in the longer run when the industry 
reaches the maturity stage such expenditure are expected to relate positively with Islamic 
banks’ performance. 
Our results regarding corporate governance reveal role duality to be positively related 
to performance, which challenges mainstream studies (Mishra & Nielsen, 2000; Pathan, 2009) 
and the corporate governance code as well as the shuratic (consultation) concept in Islamic 
ethics which sees dominance of power in one hand may reduce board effectiveness. We further 
find having more prominent scholars on the banks’ SSBs help boost profitability but reduce 
market value possibly due to the market perceiving them as less independent and too busy to 
actually perform their role effectively. Our results elucidate and suggest an alternative view to 
Mollah and Zaman (2015) on the role of shariah board in Islamic banking business model. 
Our analysis on the impact of the financial crisis indicates some differences in the 
relationship between some of the determinants and performance in the pre-, during and post-
crisis, suggesting that Islamic banks respond to changing times by adjusting their strategies 
accordingly. In times of financial distress Islamic banks tend to adjust more liquid resources 
such as CEE and SCE and reduce investments in less liquid resources such as HCE. In short, 
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our results indicate the two main variables of interest in our study to be important determinants 
of Islamic banks’ performance and that their impact on performance is dependent on macro-
events. 
Our study makes significant contributions to the corporate governance, intellectual 
capital and bank performance, Islamic banks’ performance literature streams, in particular. The 
positive results of IC efficiency and shariah governance mechanisms have important 
implications for the governing and monitoring bodies responsible for designing strategies and 
mechanisms that enable the Islamic finance industry to compete effectively and also to sustain 
competitive advantage in the market. The negative relationship between prominent scholars on 
SSB and bank market performance implies that the market pays less attention on who sits on 
the SSBs. Thus, Islamic banks should not be investing too much resources on prominent 
shariah figures to legitimise their activities to market players.  
Our study is not without limitations. Firstly, macro-economic factors such as GDP 
growth rate, inflation rate, etc. in assessing Islamic banks’ performance. Hence, the future 
research may considering the impact of these variables while assessing Islamic banks’ 
performance. Secondly, some researchers have raised concerns on the validity of VAIC as a 
method of measuring IC and future studies may adopt other indicators in capturing IC. Thirdly, 
we only focused on the impact on Islamic banks and prospect researchers may consider a 
comparative research study conventional vis-à-vis Islamic banks. Fourthly, we used Tobin’s Q 
as proxy for market performance and future studies can consider other proxies such as the 
operating efficiency measures (i.e. scale efficiency and cost discipline) proposed by Dybvig 
and Warachka (2015) when data is available. 
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Tables 
 
Table 1. Sample selection criteria 
Sample No of Islamic banks 
Initially identified Islamic banks 147 
Islamic banks merged or not in business 11 
Islamic banks with missing financial data 49 
Islamic banks with missing corporate governance data 23 
Final sample size 64 
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Table 2. Summary of operationalization of the variables 
 
Variable name Acronym Operationalization Data source 
Dependent variables    
Return on Average Assets ROAA Net income available to stockholder/ average total assets 
 
Bankscope 
Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q Market value of equity plus book value of liabilities 
divided by book value of assets  
Bankscope /Annual 
report 
Independent variables  
Intellectual capital  
Value added VA Total income – Total expenses excluding personal expenses 
 
Bankscope /Annual 
report 
Human capital  HC Total personal expenses considered as investments 
 
Bankscope /Annual 
report 
Human capital efficiency HCE HCE = VA/HC i.e. value added/human capital, or 
(Total income – Total expenses excluding personal expenses) 
divided by  
(Total personal expenses considered as investments) 
 
 
Structural capital SC SC = VA – HC i.e. value added – human capital, or 
(Total income – Total expenses excluding personal expenses) – 
(Total income – Total expenses excluding personal expenses) 
 
Bankscope /Annual 
report 
Structural capital efficiency SCE SCE = SC/VA i.e. structural capital/value added, or (VA-
HC)/VA 
[(Total income – Total expenses excluding personal expenses) – 
(Total income – Total expenses excluding personal expenses)] 
divided by  
(Total income – Total expenses excluding personal expenses) 
 
 
Capital employed CE Physical and financial capital employed or Total assets + Total 
liabilities 
 
Bankscope /Annual 
report 
Capital employed efficiency CEE CEE = VA/CE i.e. value added/physical and financial capital 
employed, or (Total income – Total expenses excluding personal 
expenses) divided by (Total assets+ Total liabilities) 
 
 
Value added intellectual 
coefficient 
VAIC VAIC = HCE + SCE + CEE  
Shariah governance variables  
Shariah supervisory board 
(SSB) size 
SSBsize Log of total number of members of SSB 
 
Annual/corporate 
governance report 
Domination of prominent 
scholars on shariah 
supervisory board (SSB) 
SSBdominance Proportion of prominent scholars to total SSB members (in 
percentage) 
Annual/corporate 
governance report 
Governance-specific variables  
Board-size Bsize Log of total number of directors on board 
 
Annual/corporate 
governance report 
Board independence Bindep Proportion of independent non-executive directors to total board 
size (in percentage) 
 
Annual/corporate 
governance report 
CEO power Dual Dummy; 1=role duality, 0 otherwise 
 
Annual/corporate 
governance report 
Audit committee size ACSize Log of total number of members serving on the audit committee 
 
Annual/corporate 
governance report 
Audit committee power ACPower Proportion of non-executives who are audit committee members 
to total board size (in percentage) 
 
Annual/corporate 
governance report 
Firm-specific control variables  
Bank size LnBankSize Log of total assets 
 
Bankscope/ Annual 
report 
Listing status List Dummy; 1=listed, 0 otherwise 
 
Bankscope/ Annual 
report 
Level of risk Risk Total debt/Total equity 
 
Bankscope/ Annual 
report 
Type of auditor Big4 Dummy; 1=Big four, 0 otherwise 
 
Annual report 
Bank’s operating structure Bos 1 = Full-fledged, 0 = Islamic windows/subsidiaries Annual/corporate 
governance report 
Accounting standard used  Accstd Dummy; 1=IFRS, 0 otherwise 
 
Annual report 
Region Region Dummy; 1 if the bank is located in GCC, 0 otherwise 
 
Annual/corporate 
governance report 
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics 
  Min Max Mean Std. Skew Kurt VIF  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
Panel A: Dependent variable 
                 
1. ROAA -.13 .77 .08 .08 -.03 .32   1                         
2. Tobin’s Q .49 2.35 1.08 .18 .03 6.81   -0.02 1                       
Panel B: Independent variables                    
3. VAIC 1.16 446.75 20.12 41.97 -.35 2.67 2.94  0.10 -0.11 1                     
4. HCE 1.02 444.80 18.51 41.72 .53 1.08 2.67  0.09 -0.10 1 1                   
5. SCE .02 1.00 .81 .19 -.23 3.46 1.55  0.21 -0.14 0.33 0.32 1                 
6. CEE .00 5.12 .81 .84 -.10 .75 1.53  0.44 -0.21 0.23 0.21 0.39 1               
7. SSB 1.00 14.00 4.23 1.92 -.32 1.95 1.45  0.15 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.37 1       
8. SSBdominance .00 1.00 .26 .30 .78 -.62 1.40  -0.06 0.03 -0.19 -0.19 -0.32 -0.29 -0.30 1      
9. Board Size 3.00 20.00 9.09 2.88 1.46 3.05 1.34  0.12 0.01 -0.10 -0.11 0.03 0.43 0.52 -0.18 1     
10. Bindep .00 .93 .65 .21 -.57 -.47 1.33  0.12 -0.03 0.09 0.09 0.01 0.05 -0.08 -0.01 -0.15 1    
11. ACSize 2.00 8.00 3.36 .87 1.48 4.50 1.29  -0.06 0.05 0.20 0.20 0.15 0.08 0.26 -0.22 0.27 -0.10 1   
12. ACPower .11 1.00 .39 .14 1.15 2.03 1.22  -0.10 0.02 0.27 0.27 0.12 -0.22 -0.14 0.00 -0.60 0.01 0.51 1   
13. BankSize (LnTA) 2.48 11.32 7.40 1.81 -0.43 -0.16 1.22  -0.15 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.10 -0.11 0.03 -0.21 0.22 0.08 0.16 -0.20 1 
14. Risk .04 1.39 0.53 0.30 -0.31 -0.90 1.18  0.05 -0.13 0.24 0.23 0.34 0.40 0.13 -0.11 0.14 0.00 0.31 -0.44 0.21 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel D: Dummy variables Mean Std. Dev. 
OS (Fully-fledged) 0 1 0.66 0.47 
Duality 0 1 0.02 0.12 
List (Listed) 0 1 0.48 0.50 
Auditor (Big4) 0 1 0.75 0.43 
Accstd (IFRS) 0 1 0.59 0.49 
Region (GCC) 0 1 0.47 0.50 
Panel C: Mean intellectual coefficient 
Year VAIC HCE SCE CEE 
2007 25.37 23.51 0.82 1.04 
2008 27.58 (+9%) 25.87 (+10%) 0.82 (+0%) 0.9 (-13%) 
2009 22.92 (-17%) 21.32 (-18%) 0.79 (-4%) 0.81 (-10%) 
2010 18.21 (-21%) 16.66 (-22%) 0.78 (-1%) 0.77 (-5%) 
2011 15.95 (-12%) 14.46 (-13%) 0.79 (+1%) 0.7 (-9%) 
2012 16.49 (+3%) 14.9 (+3%) 0.83 (+5%) 0.76 (+9%) 
2013 16.98 (+3%) 15.42 (+3%) 0.82 (-1%) 0.74 (-3%) 
2014 17.46 (+3%) 15.92 (+3%) 0.82 (+0%) 0.72 (-3%) 
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Table 4. Regression models of accounting and market based performance  
  
Predicted 
sign 
 
Model 1 
LnROAA 
Model 2 
LnTobin’sQ 
Model 3 
LnROAA 
Model 4 
LnTobin’sQ 
Observations  512 512 512 512 
R2 
 
0.255 .287 0.513 .307 
Adj. R2 
 
0.233 .266 0.496 .284 
Std.Error  2.304 0.136 1.864 .134 
(Constant) 
 
-0.137  0.042  3.056**  0.107 
 
Value added intellectual capital variables: 
LnVAIC (H1) +  0.208** -0.001   
LnHCE (H1a) +   -0.152** -0.010* 
LnSCE (H1b) +    0.203**  0.002 
LnCEE (H1c) +    0.809**  0.017** 
 
Shariah governance variables: 
LnSSBSize (H2) +  0.728*  0.028 -0.530*  0.005 
SSBdominance (H3) +  0.865* -0.107**  1.206** -0.101** 
 
Governance control variables: 
Board Size    0.117  0.005  0.261**  0.007 
Bindep    1.074*  0.042  1.016*  0.047 
Duality    2.613**  0.289**  0.940  0.262** 
LnACSize   -1.556*  0.031 -2.212**  0.023 
AcPower    1.368  0.050  5.039**  0.121 
 
Bank-specific control variables: 
Op. strategy   -1.095**  0.030* -0.630**  0.035* 
LnBankSize   -0.310** -0.027**  0.081 -0.019** 
List    0.597* -0.086**  0.643** -0.089** 
Risk   -0.004  0.000  0.002  0.001* 
Big4    0.103  0.010  0.448  0.018 
Accstd    0.722**  0.000  1.046**  0.007 
Region    1.657**  0.144**  0.646*  0.125** 
*significant at 5% and ** significant at 1% 
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Table 5. Regression models of accounting and market based performance for pre-, during and post-
crisis 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6  
Pre- crisis  
(2007) 
During 
crisis (2008-
2009) 
Post- crisis  
(2010-
2014) 
Pre-crisis  
(2007) 
During the 
crisis (2008-
2009) 
 
Post-crisis 
(2010-2014) 
 
LnROAA LnROAA LnROAA LnTobin’sQ LnTobin’sQ LnTobin’sQ 
N 64 128 320 64 128 320 
R2   0.649   0.504   0.566   0.498   0.414   0.351 
Adj. R2   0.519   0.428   0.541   0.312   0.324   0.315 
Std.Error   2.173   2.054   1.668   0.157   0.116   0.131 
(Constant) -0.330 -4.232*   5.986**   0.064   0.155   0.123 
VAIC 
components: 
   
   
LnHCE -0.192 -0.189* -0.097 -0.003 -0.006 -0.012* 
LnSCE   0.075   0.302**   0.233**   0.028*   0.007   0.001 
LnCEE   0.862**   0.714**   0.869**   0.004   0.008   0.027** 
Shariah governance variables: 
LnSSBSize   0.076 -1.551** -0.279   0.049   0.038 -0.011 
SSBdominance   2.175*   1.675*   0.743* -0.084 -0.088* -0.103** 
Corporate governance variables: 
Board Size    0.498   0.776**   0.050   0.000   0.002   0.010 
Bindep   0.243   2.367**   0.880*   0.193   0.086   0.021 
Duality -0.007   0.790   0.885   0.715**   0.322**   0.144* 
LnAC.Size -5.217 -5.005** -0.734 -0.095   0.008   0.014 
AcPower   13.370 13.411**   1.212   0.101 -0.060   0.261 
Bank-specific variables: 
Op. strategy -1.050 -0.480 -0.442*   0.001   0.006   0.058** 
Risk   0.013   0.004 -0.001 -0.001   0.00   0.001** 
LnBankSize   0.203   0.408* -0.026 -0.011 -0.017 -0.019** 
List   0.673   0.522   0.786** -0.047 -0.100** -0.097** 
Big4 -0.055 -0.158   0.795** -0.086 -0.006   0.031 
Accstd   1.988*   1.302*   0.754**   0.080 -0.017 -0.009 
Region   1.236   0.823   0.198   0.172**   0.140**   0.106** 
*significant at 5% and ** significant at 1% 
 
 
